Mobile ad hoc networks consist of wireless nodes and can be established quickly with minimal configuration and cost, because, they do not require any infrastructure in advance. Civil and military applications are using them extensively in emergency and mission-oriented scenarios respectively as multi-party communication systems. Whereas, the multi-party secret key acquisition is one of the acute issues in these low resource wireless ad hoc networks, especially, which are based on IEEE 802.11ah and IEEE 802.11ba (low power WiFi), IEEE 802.15.4(Zigbee), BLE, IEEE 802.15.6 (body-worn or wearable) devices. In this study, a novel low cost and robust approach has been proposed and tested to establish an identical secret key in a multi-user mobile ad hoc environment. We believe, it is one of the groundbreaking contributions toward establishing a cost-effective secret key acquisition solution with respect to memory, computation, and bandwidth. We have used Bloom-Filters to cope with these resource limitations of such wireless setups. The proposed approach has been tested using IEEE 802.11 adapters in a real environment, and we found it to be highly suitable for wireless resource-limited applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become an indispensable part of the social, military and healthcare applications [1] , [2] , and greatly being used in IOTs, emergencies, mobile computing and VANETs at the same time [3] . Novel paradigms in smart devices (mobiles and smartphones) are arising in different dimensions of human life in the form of IOT, wearable, and body-worn devices. These paradigms are assuring improvement in the quality of human life, which is not possible for these devices to achieve alone. WiFi-enabled smartwatches, body-worn cameras, helmets, glasses, and hand carries (bags) are a few examples of such body-worn or wearable [4] . One of the promising mode in which wireless devices can operate is an ad hoc mode in addition to infrastructure mode, in which they can also work as well. WSNs, VANETs, MANETs, and FLANETs are the most practical examples of ad hoc networks [5] , [6] . Commonly, they have been observed in The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Emrecan Demirors . the scenarios like, 1) connecting GearVR or Google Day-Dream(virtual reality head wears for audio/video streaming) with mobile or smartphone, 2) only one of the WiFi-enabled device has internet and other WiFi devices are required to share it, 3) group of friends sitting in a cafe or library wants to create temporary hotspot WiFi quickly for data sharing, 4) passengers wants to share information or internet in a train, etc. Similarly, military troops extensively make use of ad hoc networks in fields or when they are on missions, where these networks seize to exist once the mission has been completed. They highly suit the medical emergencies in disaster areas, where rest of the infrastructure has been collapsed(Tsunami, earth quick etc.). One of such motivational scenarios has been shown in Fig.1 .
Because, wireless ad hoc networks carry nation integrityrelated information in case of military and defence applications; in emergency and disasters they collect and send life critical information, that is why, reliability, security, and throughput is of prime concerns in such situations [7] . For this purpose, IEEE 802.11(WiFi) is one of the most adaptable FIGURE 1. WiFi adhoc motivation scenario [8] .
wireless technologies, which is extensively being used in this context, in addition to others such as Bluetooth, Zibgee, and NFC. Ad hoc mode of networking is very useful as it connects two or more than two WiFi devices, and allow them to send and receive data without using any additional devices like access point (WiFi router). But, due to decentralized and broadcast nature of this technology, information security emerges as a critical issue. Whereas, the most primitive type of concern in information security is confidentiality which assures the prevention of data leakage to an unauthorized person. Cryptographic operations such as encryption/decryption are used to achieve this with the help of shared secret key, which must be highly random and ephemeral in nature. In this study, we have devised a low cost multi-party secret key acquisition solution for limited resource ad hoc networks, assuring randomness and freshness of this shared secret in a timely manner.
Contributions of this study are as follows: 1) Current work is a new contribution in multi-party secret key acquisition because most of the previous proposed schemes were two-party. 2) This acquisition model is interlinked with compact key reconciliation using Bloom filters. 3) It is a low cost solution with respect to time and space, highly suits resource constrained scenarios at the same time. 4) Working of the proposed technique has been tested and verified using real 802.11 WiFi adapters. Rest of the article has been organized as II. wireless ad hoc networks, III. secret key issues, IV. our goals, V. principles behind SKG, VI. SKG background, VII. related work, VIII. our approach, IX. experimentation and result analysis, X. evaluation, XI. conclusion and future work, and XI. acknowledgment.
II. WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORKS
All the nodes in ad hoc networks can send and receive data to one another, playing the role of relay or router as well. They are self-configured, dynamic, and can be quickly deployed where network infrastructure has been collapsed. For the last couple of years, a continually increasing interest in the acquisition of these networks has been seen in different defence and civil domains due to above mentioned characteristics. But, due to certain unique attributes, for example, dynamically joining and leaving network by the wireless nodes, the design and management of these networks have become seriously challenged as compared to other contemporary and coeval networks. These challenges have motivated research community to play an active role in the innovated advancements and improvements of these networks.
Since, they are distributed type of networks having no centralized control, that is why, they are highly vulnerable to different attacks such as eavesdropping, jamming, MITM, DOS, replay, and resource consumption [9] , [10] . We, believe IEEE 802.11 is the most commonly adopted technology in this context, because of its wide provisioning in mobiles, smartphones, tablets, PCs, laptops, wearable and body-worn devices. Moreover, 802.11-based networks have commonly been observed in homes, marts, hospitals, and banks. Thus, it can be concluded, WiFi-enabled devices are easy to integrate with networks in the vicinity. Furthermore, in addition to low transmission power and energy optimization capabilities, WiFi is the only technology which provides higher bit rate and can support multimedia application like live audio/video streaming and monitoring, not possible with other wireless protocols mentioned above [11] , [12] . All these reasons motivated us to make use of 802.11 WiFi adapters in our experimentation setups for the proof of concept.
Challenges being faced by ad hoc networks are power, computation, and storage limitations, lacking of centralized control, nodes have to be collaborative inherently, frequent topology change, and security issues due to decentralization and broadcast nature such setups.
III. SECURITY: SECRET KEY ISSUES
A rapid rise in the usage of mobile ad hoc networks requires scientists and researchers to design and develop secure communication protocols for the prevention of data leakage through eavesdropping, masquerading, hacking or ransomware attacks [13] . Moreover, broadcast nature makes ad hoc networks more susceptible to security threats such as eavesdropping, traffic analysis, replay, jamming, spoofing, DOS, DDOS and modifications etc [14] , [15] . If we talk about WiFi 802.11 security, among WEP, WPA, WPA2 and WPA3, WEP and WPA has been obsoleted; WPA2 serves only those devices which were approved after 2006. The 4-way handshake protocol used to establish a new session key in WPA2 still not secure and is vulnerable to different attacks such as key re-installation [16] , [17] . So, if the secret key happens to be leaked then whole of the communication system become compromised. This shows that acquiring an ephemeral secret key in secure fashion is a basic necessity for these systems. Present secret key establishment schemes are just computationally secure, that is, with sufficient computing resources adversary can crack the secret key, hence they are based on the complexity of large prime numbers [18] and reverse computation problem of discrete logarithm [19] . Unfortunately, key exchange process is also vulnerable to ''Man In The Middle'' attack. These schemes are computationally heavy such as PKI, that is why, they are not suitable for low resource systems like MANETs, WSNs, wearable and body-worn communication scenarios. So, there is a need to look for means of identical secret key acquisition which an adversary should not be able to breach even it is equipped with unlimited processing capability.
IV. OUR GOAL: COST EFFECTIVE SECRET KEY
In this study, we have focused to establish a shared secret key among the resource considering wireless nodes operating at 2.4GHz. Our work is based on two well established facts, i) all nodes in wireless network can overhear the transmission of any node due to broadcast behavior of the medium. ii) But, the probability of any two nodes to tap exactly the same frames of bits becomes very low, almost approaches to zero [20] , [21] . Why these nodes cannot do this is due to erroneous nature of medium and incapability of wireless interface to capture and process all frames flying in the air. It is a natural wireless phenomena occurring at physical and link layer which can be harvested to fix secret key sharing problems in low-resource wireless scenarios discussed in Sec.V and Sec. VI. Furthermore, in our experimentation wireless nodes even within the range of λ/2 have not been observed to hear exactly the same frames of bits in 2.4GHz wireless environment. A very good example to illustrate above assumptions has been given in [22] , that is, its very unlikely for two persons to hear exactly the same parts of one's speech in a noisy room when they are standing at two different locations. Such conceptualization gives birth to implementation scenarios of information-theoretic security an unconditionally secure crypto-system, that is, even having unlimited computing resources adversary cannot break it [23] , [24] . Background of secret key generation in context to information-theoretic security perspectives has been discussed in coming Sec. VI.
V. PRINCIPLES BEHIND KEY GENERATION
The broadcast nature of wireless communication has been researched and found ideal for agreeing upon a common secret by transmitter and receiver. This is based upon three wireless communication principles, temporal variation, spatial correlation and channel reciprocity found at wireless physical layer. Reciprocity is responsible for observing symmetric channel path (common randomness) at transmitter and receiver for a very short time known as coherencetime. Temporal and spatial variation causes uncertainty or de-correlation of common randomness, due to which an adversary away by λ/2 from the receiver will have different observation of same channel path established between transmitter and receiver [14] , [25] , [26] . At physical layer these principles have been made as a base to propose symmetric peer-peer and group key in different scenarios of wireless networks [20] , [22] , [27] .
These principles also validate data link layer principle that its not possible for the eavesdropper to listen transmission between two nodes correctly or without missing a part of that. It has been observed that an eavesdropper drops its first packet within less than half a second due to quick de-correlation factor or erroneous nature of the wireless medium [20] . We have observed transmissions with different frame sizes, but, first IEEE 802.11 frame has always been lost within 0.5 second as shown in Fig.2 .
At this point, a fortune is this that if two legal nodes exchange information of their shared frames without leakage then they can generate a symmetric key based on common frames received correctly by them. Fortunately, there exist probabilistic data structure named Bloom filters invented by Burton Bloom in 1970 which can accomplish this [28] .
VI. SECRET KEY GENERATION: BACKGROUND
Randomness and uncertainty at wireless physical layer has been used to proof the concept of information-theoretic security in the paradigms of its practicality and implementation [29] - [31] . But, the credit of information-theoretic security back in history goes to Claud E. Shannon, a person who introduced the concept of ''perfectly secure'' system in which the secret key must be equal or larger than the length of a message, and be used only once [32] . In other words, entropy of secret key must be at least equal to the entropy of message being transmitted, that H (Key) >= H (Message), which is also observed in Vernam One-Time-Pad [33] . If a system holds such a condition then according to information theory I (Message; Cipher) = 0, means mutual information between plain text and its cipher would be zero. Whereas, I(.;.) represents mutual information and H Entropy. In the sequel of ''perfectly secure'' system, A. Wyner rules out the assumption of Shannon noiseless channel and assumed a noisy wiretap channel [34] . Wyner's concept of wiretap channel can be attained with the help of additive white-Gaussian noisy channel proposed by Choeng and Hellman [35] . Maurer in his revolutionary work, supported the Shannon's ''perfectly secure'' system model and rejected the Wyner's model of wiretap channel arguing, Wyner's model is impractical in reality [36] . Maurer's model is based on common correlated randomness which can be harnessed to acquire symmetric secret key by the transmitter and receiver. Later, this study was used by the Ahlswede, Csiszar and Narayan to compute the secret key capacity [37] , [38] . The model used by Maurer in [39] and Csiszer in [37] , [38] for acquisition of the shared secret is based on two legitimate wireless devices Alice, Bob and an adversary Eve. Alice and Bob observe a common randomness for a very short interval of time due to principal of channel reciprocity [40] . It de-correlates instantly because of temporal and spatial variations [41] . It can be envisioned in information-theoretic perspectives. For instance, If L, M , O are the signal observations made by Alice, Bob and Eve against random source of key material like channel state information, such that,
Then probabilistically, l i and m i exhibit a high dependency and correlation provided the channel is error free. But, it de-correlated instantly due to multi-path fading and scattering. Alice and Bob can secure a shared secret key K i from alike observation l i and m i , by exchanging certain set of messages. But, Eve who is separated by a distance of λ/2 from Alice or Bob will have different observations due to quick de-correlation in channel parameters as a result of spatial and temporal variation. In this scenario l i , m i , and o i are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) realizations of random variables L, M , and O respectively, whose joint probability distribution is P LMO . In current communication model V , Alice and Bob using functions SKG f (L, V ) and SKG f (M , V ) produce secret keys K A and K B over the key range K , respectively. Such a communication system must hold a property, Pr(K A = K B ) ≥ 1 − ε, which assures that two objects Alice(A) and Bob(B) can agree upon a common secret with a very high probability. Here, ε is infinitesimally small, which is not zero but less than any real number [42] , [43] . The second property asserted by these systems is H (K ) ≥ Log|K | − ε, means Key K i generated in each case is independent of the previous key and is uniformly distributed over the entire key range K. Another property claimed by these system is H (K ) ≥ n(R−ε). It means Alice and Bob can generate at least R−ε secret key bits per observation. Finally, such an information-theoretic system states I (K ; V ) ≤ ε, means Eve knows nothing or too little about key K i to guess the entire key length. Since, the communication processes at the lower layers (Physical and Link layer) of TCP/IP model are random and correlated, that is why, variables L, M , O used by Alice, Bob and Eave are treated as independent and identically distributed random variables. So, the maximum achievable rate or key capacity can be defined using Eq.(1) given below; whose outcome is such a key which can be used to encipher long messages [44] , [45] .
So, these are the properties which make informationtheoretically secure systems hard to break for an adversary who has no bound on computing power.
VII. RELATED WORK
Since, security is an important factor, that is why, a comprehensive related work from the area of ad hoc communication setups has been carried out. One of the earliest attempts to generate identical secret key between two nodes using the physical characteristics of the wireless communication was made by Jana et. al. [25] . They made use of the received signal strength (RSS) to prove common randomness exist at transmitter and receiver which can be used to generate alike key between them. They found that mobility and channel variation can lead to secret bit generation with high entropy.
Ensemble [46] extends famous Diffie-Hellman (DH) [19] secret key exchange protocol and Amigo [47] for device authentication. Proximity-based variation in RSS has been leveraged to decide whether the pairing between two wireless devices is authentic or not. Authors used Voting Systems to declare an authenticity of pairing process with the help of additional nodes already equipped with pre-shared Diffie-Hellman (DH) [19] keys. ProxiMate [48] is a sequel of Amigo [47] and Ensemble [46] , but, with additional feature of extracting shared secret while exploiting the phase of a radio signal instead of RSS, denouncing DH protocol for key exchange at the same time. ProxiMate is computationally simple as its complexity is O(n) compared with Diffie-Hellman(DH) [19] whose complexity is O(n 3 ). Another attempt, to establish a secret key between body-worn devices was made by Jeff and Tsouri [49] , which is based on RSS measured from the packets being sent forward and backward like data and its ACK using the WBAN AP. WBAN AP sends a poll-request-packet against which the data packets is sent by the WBAN device on the reverse link. Similarly, Taha and Sivaraman [50] have harnessed the motion-based variation in RSS as a source of randomness to create a shared secret between two body-worn devices. ASK-BAN [51] also exploits the RSS feature of wireless channel for pair-wise and group key acquisition. They used static channels for device authentication and dynamic ones for secret key extraction. For this approach to work effectively, devices must be in line of sight, and they also must be multi-hop relay nodes working in a collaborative fashion. iARC [52] utilizes RSS to establish a pair-wise secret key between two WBAN devices. They used channel hopping to introduce the randomness artificially. Similarly, using the same channel parameter RSS, secret key generation for line-of-sight and non line-of-sight has been accomplished by the authors of is a combination for two protocols, one for pairwise and other for group key acquisition. It is a generalized protocols which can be configured to make use any of the wireless signal characteristics such as amplitude, phase, strength of the radio signal transmitted in Coherence-Time. This protocol assumed the nodes to be arranged in a ring fashion which is not feasible in all scenarios. Secret key without using cryptography was accomplished by Safaka et. al. [22] between two or multiple nodes of 802.11 standard(2.4GHz). They exploited the communication properties of data link layer for this purpose, where a large number of packet exchange and re-transmissions has been used to obtain sufficient number of identical packets at different nodes. This idea is software based, and brings no change in the existing architecture of the hardware. But, this approach severely suffers from a lot of packet exchange, re-transmission and storage issues, which are making it bandwidth and space hungry. In addition to this, linear combination and the use of error correcting codes demands a handsome amount of computing resources; this means it is less suitable for low resource scenarios. Secret key acquisition based on the similar principles as in [22] has been evaluated and proposed in [27] , which is basically a slight variation of secret key generation technique presented in [57] . Creating secure key from wireless erasure environment was presented by Katrina et. al. [58] . In this technique, they used beam-forming for creating more noisy environment; further they used wiretap coding to transmit shared secret from one node to another node. They proposed that if the secret is made to be transmitted with SNR less than the receiving SNR of the adversary but greater than that of legal node, then, that transmission will be decoded by legal, but, not by the adversary. This scheme demands to have the prior knowledge of the attacker SNR and provision of directional antenna on each wireless node in the network.
VIII. OUR APPROACH FOR SECRET KEY SHARING
Before discussing the steps of secret key generation in this study, its better to discuss Bloom filter, on which, our proposed approach is based upon. Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure of type bit array. It is used to check the membership of an element in the set. A large number of elements can be represented in a very small space of Bloom filter. That is why, they have great applications in the area of computer science, software engineering, databases, network communication and information security [59] , [60] . Due to space/time efficiency, they are highly suitable to carry a large number of frames information from one entity to another over a low resource networks such as WSN, WBAN, WiFi, Zigbee, Bluetooth, and NFC [61] . Working of Bloom filter is very simple; Bloom filter of size m is initialized with 0. Then, an element d from input set S is passed to k different hash functions. Their output is the index values of the Bloom filter from 0 to (m-1); these indices are set to 1. All other elements are inserted in the same way. When the membership of an element need to be checked, it is passed to the same set of hash functions, and if all the resultant indices are 1, the element is present, otherwise not. Bloom filter never generate False-Negative, that is, it never reply ''Does Not Exist'' to a membership query operation when an element d ∈ S. But, False-Positive can be observed, that is, it can reply to membership query operation Element Does Exist, even if an element d / ∈ S. So, the price to pay for using Bloom filter is the false positive rate(FPR) which grows with the rate of filling insertions. false positive rate (FPR) can be optimized by keeping reasonable size of Bloom filter and the number of hash functions. Moreover, by using different collision resistant hashing techniques, FPR can be minimized further.
An interesting feature of Bloom filter is this that there is a well-defined trade-off between size m of Bloom filter (space and bandwidth factor), the number of hash function k(computation factor), and FPR (error probability) [61] . k and m can be configured in such way that false positive rate fall within the tolerable limits. If we know the size of input n and error probability threshold, then the size m and the number of hashing functions k can be determined. Obviously, P B[i] =1 the probability of not setting a certain location after the addition of n elements) is (1 − 1/m) kn ≈ e −kn/m . This approximation has been made from well-known formula for calculating e, that is, e = lim x→∞ ( 
It can be seen that the values of k and m can lessen FPR to a great extent [62] . Thus, knowing the size of input n and P FP , the number of hash functions k and size of bloom the filter m can be estimated using Eq. 
The derivation procedure of these equations is beyond the scope of this article, but, can be reviewed at [59] , [63] . These equations give approximate values, for desired accuracy, we highly recommend that user must configure the values of m and k against a certain value of error probability instead of fully relying on theoretical values of m and k derived from these equations. Reason for such recommendation has been discussed in sec. X-B2.
A. STEP1: WIRELESS TAPPING/SNIFFING
Sniffing is the technique in which wireless nodes can capture network packets not even destined to them. Wireless nodes can be set in three modes, network, promiscuous and monitor mode. Network mode is a normal communication mode where nodes can communicate with one another nodes in the network. Promiscuous mode allows the wireless interface to capture packets belonging only to its own network. The packets being captured in this mode have pseudo MAC header attached to it instead of original one. Moreover, these packets do not contain wireless MAC and radio information. Whereas, packets captured in monitor mode renders whole frame along with wireless MAC and radio information.The monitor mode is highly suitable for the analysis of layer2, which include data, ACKs, control and management frames transmission from the specified channel. We have used tcpdump and Wireshark for 802.11 frames capture and analysis. From our practical and hands-on-working, we have found, Kali Linux a highly suitable operating system platform to carry out such sort of research activities because it is equipped with all required software, commands and tools. Windows operating systems provides no support to work in monitor mode with the exclusion of specialized paid software named ''Acrylic WiFi Software'' [64] .
For the current study, we set nodes in monitor mode to sniff IEEE 802.11 frames from the wireless MAC layer for the purpose of multi-node secret key generation. For sniffing, nodes in the monitor have been observed with well-known non-overlapping channel 1, 6, and 11 as shown in Fig.3 . Anomaly has been detected too, that is, node in the monitor mode also sniffs some packets from the adjacent or other channels due to channel overlapping [65] - [67] . During capturing frames from specified channel 11, some of the frames from 10 and 1 have also been observed to be captured by 802.11 nodes. The statistics of such as capture has been shown in Fig. 4 . It is a Wireshark screenshot of statistics about WLAN traffic captured by node ''CC'' in Test1, which is discussed in Sec. IX-A. In addition to 98.68% frames from channel 11, about 0.31% and 0.33% frames from channel 1 and 10 have also been sniffed by this node. It is necessary to mention, the values shown in Fig. 4 are just the fractions of these percentages.
The set of linux commands used to carry out this research have been given in the Table. 1. 
B. STEP2: POPULATING BLOOM FILTER
Once, the wireless nodes have been set in a monitor mode, they start capturing 802.11/2.4GHz frames of the specified channel from its surrounding, and save them in one of the packet capturing format, such as, .pcap or .pcapng. We have used .pcap file format for packet capturing because of its simplicity. When wireless nodes complete capturing to a certain level, then they populate their respective Bloom filters. The nodes N 1 , N 2 , N 3 , . . . N n populate their Bloom filters α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , . . . α n respectively using one of the group function SHA, MD5, and Murmer. We used Murmer hash functions in this study because they are fast to compute and generate relatively good hash codes [68] . Murmer with seed values ranging between 41 and 47 were selected to be used. Once, this step has been completed, reliably, these nodes exchange their Bloom filters with one another using feed back mechanism. Let, f 1 , f 2 , f 3 . . . f n are 802.11/2.4GHz frames which a wireless nodes has sniffed, then they will be inserted in Bloom filter α of size m with k hash functions H = {h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ....h k } using Algo.1. It is a frames insertion algorithm, where the size of Bloom filter, number of hash functions and their identity is kept alike at all nodes.
C. STEP3: DETERMINING IDENTICAL FRAMES
Upon receiving the Bloom filters from other nodes successfully, each node determines the commonality of Bloom filters α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , . . . α n at their own sites. The Algo.2 has been used Algorithm 1 Insert Frames Into Bloom filter 1: for i=1 to m STEP 1 do 2: α x [i] ← 0 //Set Bloom filter Locations to 0 3: end for 4: for i=1 to n STEP 1 do 5: for j=1 to k STEP 1 do 6 : index ← index + 1 11: end for by each node to find the intersection of all the Bloom filters received from others.
D. STEP4: EXTRACTING SET OF COMMON FRAMES
Once the commonality among α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , . . . α n has been computed, then each of the nodes at own site is responsible for finding the set of common frames using check membership(query) algorithm Algo. 3. It is used to determine whether a particular frame exists in common Bloom filter β or not. The frames which has been mapped common Bloom filter β will be separated as SKGFames set. This set is probably identical at nodes N 1 , N 2 , N 3 , . . . N n . The probability of un-alikeness comes from the False Positive Rate(FPR) which is manageable when the Bloom filter of reasonable length is populated with optimum number of hash functions, as discussed in Sec..
E. STEP5: SECRET KEY GENERATION
When the set of common SKG frames has been computed by each node, then they can generate a fixed length symmetric SK [i] ← 0 3: end for 4: for j=1 to n STEP 1 do 5: h j = H (f j ) 6 : SK = SK ⊕ h j 7: end for 8: return SK key using any well-known pre-shared non-key cryptographic hash function such as SHA, SHA256, SHA512, BLAKE, and MD5 etc. Eve does not participate in the secret key generation process because it does not share its blooms filter. It only captures the Bloom filters of others, who share the state of their Bloom filters. That is why, nodes other than Eve can generate a secret key, but, Eve cannot do so. This incapability of Eve is a consequence of some missing frames, which were correctly captured by others nodes. Moreover, Eve cannot share its Bloom filter; executing such an action it can be detected easily because it is not the part of a network to whom legal nodes belong. Each node at its site will pass its set of common SKG frames to the pre-shared hash function. This function which will generate a fixed length secret key using a simple process shown in Algo.4. In this algorithm, XORing of computed hashes of SKG frames is carried out to generate a symmetric key at all legal nodes. Reason to choose one of the existing hash function is, they are designed, tested and released after several years effort of world's top cryptographers. So, it is not a good idea trying to design a better hash function within a few days or months.
F. STEP6: KEY VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION
Secret key generated by two nodes can be validated through simple challenge-response protocol, HMAC (Hash Based Message Authentication Code) or CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check). CRC is one of the simplest protocol, which is easy to implement in software and hardware with low processing overhead. That is why, we recommend CRC-based challenge-response protocol for this key validation process using Algo.5. In this algorithm sender sends an encrypted CRC of its own key, receiver decrypts it and sends back encrypted CRC+1. Sender decrypts and matches it with its own CRC+1, if matched, the key is valid, otherwise SKG process is started again.
G. STEP7: ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION
After it has been verified that the key is valid, then that can be used for actual secure encrypted communication between two or more than two nodes using some encryption protocol such as AES. Moreover, if secret key does not refresh in timely fashion, it can be compromised. We recommend, use of new secret key for a new transmission session strengthens the security of a crypto-system which is hard to break,
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regardless how much computationally powerful an adversary is. Hence, a new key can be acquired quickly from a small number of common frames. This is what, we call ephemeral or dynamic keys, an excellent application of the unconditional or information-theoretic security.
IX. EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULT ANALYSIS
Experimentation has been carried out using 802.11 WiFi devices of alike and different vendors for keeping setup close to real scenarios. Three different types of tests has been conducted, which have been discussed in Sec.IX-A, IX-B and IX-C.
A. TEST1
In order to test how many frames can be overlapped between two nodes, we set up a simple scenario where two nodes were set in the monitor mode to capture the frames of IEEE 802.11/2.4GHz protocol flying the air. Devices labels shown in Fig.5 or subsequent figures of similar scenarios are the last Byte of their MAC addresses. We also deployed an ad hoc network of two nodes which could send and receive a simple file of any format. Nodes capture frames from the specified frequency at which two-node ad hoc network is operating, or the frames might belong to other 802.11 networks using the same frequency for transmission and reception. The nodes has been observed capturing frames of neighboring channels as well due to channel overlapping. But, their ratio compared to specified frequency is very low, moreover, it is not the concern of our discussion in this study. Still, a snap-shot from the Wireshark has been given in Fig.4 to show such an unexpected behavior. It can be seen from the Fig.4 that beside specified channel 11, current node ''CC'' has also captured some packets from channel 1 and 10. This behavior has already been discussed in Sec.VIII-A
We set up devices in the Graduate Research Lab. of our university; and a 5.5Mb file was sent from device1 (54) to device2 (26) . Nodes set in the monitor mode started and stopped manually to capture WiFi frames in the air and store them in .pcap format. We tested Wireshark and tcpdump; it was observed that both perform well in capturing process. But, the results in this article have been extracted from the files, captured using tcpdump. As a sample information, only one of the sniffed .pcap files from each test has been shown in the Table. 2 because all other files also contain almost similar amount and type of information. For our current study, all discussion will revolve around the data packets. Experimentation setup used for Test1 has been shown in Fig.5 . But, it is worth to mention here that RTS/CTS is disabled by default in wifi ad hoc mode because it does not perform well in this mode [69] . Thus the RTS/CTS frames seen in Table. 2 do not belong to our two-node ad hoc set-up rather to other infrastructure based on 802.11 networks.
From Table. 3, it can be seen, there is quite reasonable overlapping of frames between every two devices. This table is showing the intersection of data frames as a sum of One Time Frames(OTF) and re-transmitted(Retry). The same convention has been followed in all three cases for representing intersection. Overlapping shown in the table includes frames of two-node ad hoc network and others operating at the same channel. Overlapping of frames excluding those belong to our own two-node network eliminates the requirement of data transmission and setup of this two-node network as well. It also causes, reduction in the overhead of bandwidth at the same time. Furthermore, if networks nodes are required to communicate in group fashion then we need to check intersection between more than two devices to observe the behavior of proposed scheme. That is why, we calculated overlapping of frames among 3, 4 and 5 nodes as shown in the Table.4, Table.5 and Table. 6 respectively. Among 5 devices frames have been overlapped up to a reasonable extent, such that, generating alike key from this information for these devices is highly possible. The overlapping of OTF between 6 nodes was found about 6000 frames. We determined, maximum, minimum and average of intersection against 2,3,4,5 and 6 nodes. Fig. 6 clearly shows that there is about 6000 to 7000 alike frames between 2 to 6 nodes, which concludes that this behavior is a better candidate for generating a shared secret in wireless networks.
B. TEST2
In Test2, we want to see behavior of more number of nodes in a grouped fashion. So, we set up two groups, each of five nodes as shown in the Fig.7 .
The purpose of this experimentation was to see the applicability of proposed model for secret key establishment in scenarios where the wireless nodes are communicating in a grouped fashion such as cooperative nodes [70] , non-chargeable or re-chargeable groups [71] . The purpose of referring these two articles is just to show, that, sometimes we need to establish secret key between group of nodes, such as military troupes, group of devices located and communicating on parts of the same body etc. We had a Graduate Research Lab. arrangement in such a way, that we have to put the nodes in a setup as shown in the Fig. 7 . In this setup, nodes of group1 were slightly close to two-node ad hoc sender and receiver compared to the nodes od group2. It can be seen from the Table. 7, that there is a reasonable frames overlapping between each 2 nodes belonging to group1 and every 2 nodes of group2. Minimum intersection between every 2, 3, 4 and 5 nodes of group1 is 4445, 4125, 3944, 3837 and in group2, the values are 4380, 4107, 3723 and 3637 respectively for the same number of nodes. The results of intersection for 2, 3, 4 and 5 nodes have been drawn from Table.7, Table.8,  Table.9, and Table. 10 respectively. One of the good news is this, that there is a reasonable number of alike frames captured by two groups, that is about 3005 OTF frames. These results affirm that a secret key can be established between two groups of nodes operating at two different locations.
C. TEST3
The purpose of Test3 is to determine the overlapped frames when the nodes are moving, because there are different mobility models, grouped-mobility is one of them [72] . We took same 10 capturing devices of Test2 and divided them into two groups, group1 and group2. We moved one group of nodes close to two-node ad hoc network within the area of about 16ftx12ft and other group of nodes in the area of about 100ftx20ft in Graduate Research Lab. of our university. This typical setup has been shown in Fig.8 .
We have observed that distance from the source and mobility of nodes create more uncertainty in capturing process, also affects frames overlapping to a considerable extent. But, it was still in the figure of 1000 frames, which is still a good number of common frames for the generation of symmetric secret key between two mobile groups. Minimum intersection between every 2 and 3 nodes of group1 is 3378, and 3201, whereas, between 4 and 5 is 3110. Similarly, in case of group2, the intersection between every 2 and 3 nodes is 2130, 1895 and every 4 and 5 is 1858, as shown in Table.11,  Table. 12, Table.13 and Table. 14 respectively. This model is fully applicable where nodes are moving in group/groups because about 1242 alike frames exist between two groups as shown in Table. 14.
X. EVALUATION
There are different parameters which are being used in literature to check whether the proposed secret key generation procedure is worth to be adopted or not. The main purpose of this study is not to reject the existing cryptographic technologies for secret key acquisition, but, just to contribute in devising low cost, salable, and robust secret key acquisition solution for limited resource wireless scenarios. We have selected some parameters such as Randomness, Key Generation Rate (KGR), Key Mismatch Rate (KDR), Key Refresh Rate (KRR), compatibility, and Cost (in terms of bandwidth, Power Consumption, processing, extra hardware) to evaluate proposed scheme.
A. RANDOMNESS
Encryption key must contain substantial amount of randomness, that is, all bits must be uniformly distributed over the entire key length. People uses NIST software suit for testing randomness or its guidelines to measure this parameter [73] . But, NIST software suit requires a very large string of 0s and 1s, sometimes it crashes as well. That is why, we used Python libraries Tskidmarks [74] and SciPy [75] to test the randomness of shared secret generated through procedure already discussed in VIII-E. These libraries are being used extensively in scientific and research industry for statistical tests.
The most popular tests used to test randomness of a binary string are Runs-Test, χ 2 − test, Shannon average entropy and correlation. In this evaluation, for simplicity Hash is the resultant hash value of five common frames (from Test3) which are XORed and hashed using SHA512. The binary output of Hash = SHA512(5e173fc0456b09ef 53f 2872ff 131 e1a8a0c252ab1e16afe5 . . .)⊕Hash(1b784e94b9f 12f 5615b0 8d8ab4b8ddc750f 999d4e3ef 2427 . . .)⊕Hash(b477046129fb c9cbf 72179aa65061b6b3193907bd4dc60d3 . . .)⊕Hash(611 7dbd184532a952bfebf 5581fd4ca96fd4780ea5a3ffe8 . . .)⊕ Hash(309e5bab7ee2252f 69051f 84674b8677a2395288579 ddd7e . . .)⊕Hash(5e173fc0456b09ef 53f 2872ff 131e1a8a0c 252ab1e16afe5 . . .) is 0b10001010100011001001100000111 100110 0011101010010111000110111100010001110011 0 10001101111110110011000011010001110000010 1000011 100101001011000001111000000110111 000011001011011 0011000000011000110001001 01011001111010110101001 01000111101100100 1010100011001111110000100000011 000100001 011000111011110100111110100101001101111 1 11000110010101010011000011000011000111001 00011 010110011111000111110011101010100001 101111111111 01110111011100100101100000001 0000010001001010101 0100100110101000000000 00010110001000000110110110 100. The randomness of this output has been tested using Runs, χ 2 , entropy and correlation tests.
Runs test is one of the most practiced test in science and engineering to testify the randomness of information. For long string of binary symbols 0s and 1s, the runs test formulates two hypothesis. H 0 : The given binary string is random; H 1 : The given binary string is not random. Furthermore, in science and engineering significance level α is taken as 0.05 for statistical test. The statistics of Runs test [76] are
R is observed number of runs, µ is the expected number of runs and σ is the standard deviation which is square root of the variance, σ 2 . µ, σ 2 can be computed using 6 and 7.
Where, N = N 0 + N 1 and N 0 , N 1 are number of 0s and 1s in the binary string respectively. When, we subjected the output of SHA512 to the Runs Test, we found R = 254,N 0 = 239,N 1 = 273,µ = 255.871,σ 2 = 11.252, z = −0.1666, p = 0.238. Since the Abs|Z | < Z 1−α/2 , that is why, there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis, means the binary string has been generated through a random process [76] .
Chi-Square Test is another used to testify the randomness using statistics given in Eq.(8) [77] , [78] .
Passing, the output of SHA512 to χ 2 Test, we found DOF = 1, O k 239, 273, E k 256, 256, χ 2 = 2.25. Since P α=0.10 < (χ 2 = 2.25) ≤ P α=0.05 , that is why we have no reason to reject null hypothesis. Thus, the output is truly a random sequences of bits [79] .
Entropy is the measure of an uncertainty, thus more the bits of shared secret are random in nature more will be the uncertainty in guessing this shared secret. Entropy can be calculated using Eq.(9)
Entropy of the given bit sequence has been found to be 0.7 which means it is quite uncertain, or random. Similarly, binary string with low auto-correlation indicates more randomness. We found a very low auto-correlation that is 0.005 of a given string, almost close to 0. At a confidence level α = 0.05, the obtained value of auto-correlation indicates that the bit sequence is highly random in nature.
B. OVERHEADS 1) TRANSMISSION
Secret key can be acquired even without the setup of 2-node ad hoc sender and receiver. It means we do not need to make transmission for secret key generation. The nodes in monitor-mode can capture free frames flying in the air, whose commonality can be processed and can be used to acquire a shared secret key later. We randomly selected devices of Test1, Test2 and Test3 to determine the intersection of frames captured in monitor mode. We have selected nodes randomly and considered only those frames whose type was 'Data', excluding the frames of two-node network. Due to space limitation, we have represented (CC ∩ CF), (D0 ∩ E6), (CC ∩CF ∩BE), (CC ∩CF ∩D0∩E6), (CC ∩CF ∩D0∩E6∩ BE) by a, b, c, d, and e; (B4 ∩ B7),
h, i and j respectively. The number of identical frames found were 367, 272, 221 in Test1, Test2 and Test3 respectively as shown in Table. 15. These results clearly claim that we do not need to make any transmission for obtaining frames to use them as a key material, rather, free frames are available in the air for this purpose.
In addition to this, Bloom filters are small in size, that is why, their transmission requires minute bandwidth at the same time.
2) OPTIMIZATION OF THE BLOOM FILTER
Number of input frames n, size of Bloom filter m and number of hash functions k can be configured according to underlying wireless nodes resources. This can be seen from the Table16 that for certain specific size of overlapped frames(n) and some acceptable value of FPR the size of Bloom filter(m) and the optimum number of hash functions(k) can be decided using equations 4 and 3. There are different online tools [80] to find the values of these variables. We have verified their results using a spread sheet software Open Office Calc installed on Linux Platform. Number of hash functions k grows linearly with bits per item m/n. Increasing the number of hash functions would incur more processing overhead. Similarly, increasing the size of Bloom filter would increase the storage overhead. No doubt, these two parameters play a great role in reducing FPR. But, at the same time, they must be chosen with great care because they directly affect the resources of wireless nodes. Beside all that, Bloom filters are efficient with respect to limitations of memory, processing and bandwidth. These features determine that small-sized Bloom filter can carry a lot of information over the network.
To verify the theoretical claims, for input size N=3500 frames at the rate of 0.0001false positive, the theoretical values of Bloom filter's size and optimum number of hash functions calculated were 67096 and 13 respectively. We took two .csv files exported from captured frames database of Test3 where the size of one file was 3497 and of other was 2177 frames. We found 0 false positives with m=60000 and k=7, after trying different values of m and k. The Bloom filters of both files were cross queried, and in both cases, the match found was 1615 data items. It was the number which was obtained when the query was executed in SQL to find common frames between these two files (SQL Tables). It shows, that, its the responsibility of security system designer to find the optimum values of m and k for system under consideration instead of totally relying on the theoretical claims. These claims may speed up the process of finding optimum values of m and k for certain value of input size n and FPR. They cannot provide us exact values because nature of the selected hashing algorithms also affects them.
C. RELIABILITY AND ROBUSTNESS: ATTACK MODEL
Robustness and reliability of the proposed model has been verified with three attackers deployed in a very close proximity of the group1, but, away from group2. We took two attacker nodes having double the antenna gain as compare to other nodes. We have observed that even three attackers in close cooperation cannot compromise this secret key acquisition process. Critics would say that it could be compromised with more number of attacker, but, we believe that an enemy deploying more number of attackers would increase the probability of their detection and isolation at the same time. Moreover, it is not practically economical for an enemy to deploy number of attacker equal or greater than the legal nodes for stealing the key material. Beside all that, attackers can be defeated easily on the cost of more number of frames captured in the capturing process because it will reduce the probability of tapping exactly the same frames by attackers as that of legal nodes. From analysis, we have come to the conclusion that one, two or three key stealers would never be able to compromise SKG process even having twice the antenna gain of legal node. Results give in Table. 17 are showing the number of frames missed by eavesdropper in case of single, two and three attacker nodes. But, beside all that, even single frames missed by eavesdropper is enough to create a shared secret.
D. KGR
KGR depends upon the capturing speed of the devices. In worst case scenario, we have found about 1200 frames overlapped among 10 devices each having capture size of 9-10Mb with capturing duration of about 90 seconds. If we go back to Fig. 2 , it has already been verified that a frame becomes lost by an eavesdropper within less than half a second. Whereas, it is a worst case, when a node is closer to two-node ad hoc sender and receiver. So, with distance and movement, time of first frame lost can be shifted toward zero from its mean. On a Haier Laptop model 7G-4H with 1.7GHz Core i3 4th generation processor, 4Gb DDR3 memory and 3 MB cache, the total time to fill Bloom filter, extracting common frames with parameters n(number of input frames)=3500, m(size of Bloom filter)=60000 (occupies 7.5KB on disk), k(number Murmer hash functions)=7, and FPR(false positive rate)=0, and generation of secret key using SHA512 was found to be 0.204 second. If exchange of Bloom filter(m=60000 bits) at minimum speed of 1Mbps takes 0.06 second then with 0.5 second capturing, the approximate time to generate 512 bits of the secret key would be 0=0.764 second.
E. KMR
In our case, evaluation of key mismatch rate is completely different from other proposed approaches. In this study, it is closely related to FPR of the Bloom filter. But, the interesting feature is this, unlike the other techniques, in our approach FPR can be tuned on the cost of minor number memory bytes.
F. KRR
Key Refreshing of secret key is very necessary for the robustness and reliability of the cryptographic system. Key refresh rate (KRR) also determines the probability of key compromise. Since, key generation process is not expensive, that is why, a new key can easily be acquired quickly for new communication session and the old key can be discarded. Such type of secret keys are termed as ephemeral or dynamic keys.
G. COMPATIBILITY
Since, it is software based scheme, that is why, it is fully compatible with existing TCP/IP network stack and does not require any of the layers to be changed.
H. SCALABILITY
Current technique is scalable to any extent of the wireless network density. A new node can acquire a group key, provided, any of the network nodes having group key captures frames along with this new node. Then both exchange their new Bloom filter. These nodes end-up with a alike pairwise key execute proposed scheme. This network node will encrypt its group key with newly acquired pairwise key and sends it to new node which can decrypt it with the same pairwise key, resulting in the acquisition group key.
XI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We are confident to state that the working of proposed secret key acquisition technique has been tested and verified using real IEEE 802.11 wireless adapters. Space efficient data structure make it suitable for low resource wireless devices. Its strength and robustness increases with the density of network. A strong resistant against single node, joint 2 and 3-node attack has been observed. Due to low overheads, proposed solution is highly suitable for ephemeral secrets in resource constrained wireless ad hoc networks.
As for the future work is concerned, we have planned to device a secret key acquisition for heterogeneous IOT devices using different wireless technologies which is one of the great challenge in current research at this time.
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